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Article
‘Who’ or ‘what’ is the
rule of law?
Steven L. Winter
Wayne State University Law School, USA
Abstract
The standard account of the relation between democracy and the rule of law focuses on law’s
liberty-enhancing role in constraining official action. This is a faint echo of the complex, constitutive
relation between the two. The Greeks used one word – isonomia – to describe both. If democracy
is the system in which people have an equal say in determining the rules that govern social life, then
the rule of law is simultaneously before, after, concurrent and synonymous with democracy: It
contributes to the formation of citizens with the capacity for self-governance, serves as the
instrument through which democratic decisions are implemented, functions as one of the central
social practices that constitute citizens as equals and addresses the question of how to ensure that
government by the people operates for the people. The rule of law has many independently
valuable qualities, including impartiality and predictability. But, to valorise the rule of law for its
own sake is to fetishize authority. The fundamental values of the rule of law are as the instrument
of democratic self-governance and the expression of the equal dignity of all persons. Democracy
thus entails the rule of law, but both implicate the yet more comprehensive ideal of equality. Core
rule-of-law values require political norms and conditions of equality, generality and comprehen-
siveness. In a modern, differentiated society, however, the constitutive relation between
democracy and the rule of law is fractured and law becomes the agent of authority. Courts in the
modern constitutional state have contributed to the decline of rule-of-law values, supporting role
specialization through judge-made immunity doctrines that protect officials at all levels. The crisis
of police violence against minorities is a symptom of this breakdown. Greater accountability can
ameliorate the problem. But an effective solution requires the fair and equal distribution of political
power.
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I Law and democracy
Democracy and the rule of law – like song and dance or pen and paper – seem a natural
pair. The connection between the two is an entrenched part of our political tradition; yet,
the exact nature of the relation is unclear. On one hand, one can imagine a small self-
governing group that follows no precedents or rules but votes on each and every issue or
dispute as it comes up.1 (Though it may seem far-fetched, this is pretty much how many
law faculties function.) On the other, one can imagine an authoritarian society – Singa-
pore comes to mind – that applies its laws with a rigorous impartiality and harsh even-
handedness. So, what is the relation between democracy and the rule of law?
The most common answer is that the rule of law protects liberty by imposing con-
straints on official action. This is Justice Jackson’s characterization in Youngstown Sheet
& Tube: ‘The essence of our free Government is “leave to live by no man’s leave,
underneath the law” – to be governed by those impersonal forces which we call law’.2
‘A government of laws and not of men’ is, on this view, one in which official action is
governed by pre-existing rules of sufficient clarity and generality to preclude the arbi-
trary whim of individuals or the brute impositions of power.3 So understood, the rule-of-
law ideal is closely entwined with law’s traditional tendency towards formalism. This,
for example, is the view promoted in Justice Scalia’s well-known article The Rule of Law
as a Law of Rules,4 which insists that standards, totality of the circumstances and multi-
factor balancing tests are not ‘“law”, properly speaking’.5 On this view, the logical
compulsion of a rule is what gives law its impersonal force.6
The rule of law is also liberty enhancing in that it provides the order and stability
necessary for individuals to exercise their rights. It enforces contracts, protects property
and safeguards one’s physical integrity from accident or assault. On this understanding,
the rule of law is a pre- or co-condition of democracy.7 Even so, this understanding of the
rule of law is not as fully benign as it seems. It presents the law as a guarantor of our
expectations, but that law appears as a top-down authority which oversees social life.8
The law acts on citizens who, however grateful for the law’s protections, are nevertheless
its subjects. For James Madison, this top-down, law-as-authority view is prior to and (it
would appear) more fundamental than the rule of law as a constraint on officials: ‘you
must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place, oblige it
to control itself’.9
Both these understandings of the rule of law are quintessentially liberal in that they
focus on individual freedom from interference or restraint. But they complicate the
relation between democracy and the rule of law in four escalating ways. First, on its
own terms, the liberal view of the rule of law is auxiliary to democracy: Ex ante, the rule
of law protects liberty as a precondition of democracy. Ex post, it protects us from
breaches of fiduciary duty by those we empower over us. As such, it bears only a
second-order or supplemental relation to democracy. Second, as Michel Rosenfeld
observes, the liberal version of the rule-of-law ideal creates a paradox:
In terms of the institutional framework necessary for constitutional democracy, . . . the rule
of law seems definitely on the side of the state, and often against the citizen. In contrast, in
connection with protection of fundamental constitutional rights, the rule of law seems on the
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side of the citizen against the state to the extent that constitutional law can be invoked by
citizens against laws and policies of the state.10
Third, the idea of law as the guarantor of social order can be seen as a direct challenge
to democracy: It appears (as in the Madison quote) as an authority that governs and not as
the product of choices by self-governing citizens.11
Fourth, the liberal understanding entails a twofold reification that subverts the relation
between democracy and the rule of law. On one hand, it reifies the law as a set of rules
and principles distinct from the actual humans who create and direct it. This masks a
vicious circularity that, as Pocock explains, threatens the whole point of the rule-of-law
ideal: ‘laws ensure that reason rules and not particular passions, but they are invented and
maintained by men’.12 On the other hand, this reification detaches law from its source
and legitimacy in democratic self-governance. In Frank Michelman’s words, law
becomes ‘an autonomous force’ that provides ‘an external untouchable rule of the
game’.13
Perhaps we can do better if we focus on other, widely accepted dimensions of the rule-
of-law ideal. In previous work, I identified the four characteristics of the rule of law as
accountability, comprehensiveness, equality and ordinariness.14 Accountability, as
already discussed, is the idea that official action must conform to law.15 Comprehen-
siveness is the notion that no one is above the law and that even the highest officials are
subject to legal strictures.16 Equality is the principle that everyone is governed by the
same law without regard to status or person.17 This is the ideal expressed in the maxims
‘equality before the law’ and ‘equal justice under law’.
Ordinariness is perhaps the most overlooked aspect of the rule-of-law ideal. In his
classic discussion of the rule of law, A.V. Dicey identified the quality of ordinary law
administered by ordinary tribunals.18 It is the sense in which great issues of constitu-
tional law can be raised and determined in a routine action for trespass or assault.19 It is
the sense in which we recognize the rule of law as vindicated when General Pinochet is
detained by regular municipal police officers acting on the authority of an arrest warrant
issued by the Bow Street magistrates’ court, one of London’s local criminal courts.20
Ordinariness is a crucial tenet of the rule of law in common law systems without
independent constitutional causes of action, as we were in the early Republic.21 Citizens
would have little recourse unless ordinary courts stood open to enforce the common law
without regard to the official status of even the highest governmental actors. But even
under our constitutional system, the understanding persists that an officer who acts in
violation of the law is ‘stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected
in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct’.22 Thus, police officers who
during the course of their duties use excessive force in violation of the Constitution or
other laws are liable to prosecution for murder or assault like any other person. Ordinary
law administered by ordinary tribunals even in extraordinary cases.
It will have occurred to you that all these characteristics of the rule-of-law ideal are
connected. Comprehensiveness, accountability and ordinariness all follow from the idea
that – if law is truly to rule – it must apply to everyone equally. Thus, equality before the
law is the general principle from which ‘no one is above the law’ follows. This includes
officials, who are answerable to the law for their actions. The openness of ordinary courts
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to apply the ordinary rules to all manner of litigants is a necessary corollary if the
comprehensiveness and equality of the law are to be maintained.
The demand for equality brings into focus the connection between democracy and the
rule of law. In what follows, I argue that the rule of law, democracy and equality are
nested concepts – each resting on the latter, more encompassing idea. Democracy, in
other words, entails the rule of law; but, both democracy and the rule of law implicate the
yet more comprehensive ideal of equality. As we shall see, this way of understanding the
conceptual relation between democracy and the rule of law has profound implications.
We need a working definition of democracy to start. It is conventional to identify
democracy with majority rule or consent of the governed. But it is a correspondingly
familiar riposte that one cannot define democracy in these terms without collapsing the
idea in on itself. Imagine a majority that votes to suppress speech or disenfranchise an
unpopular minority. Or consider a community that consents to autocratic rule. We
recognize such actions as undemocratic.23 But, how could we know that if majority rule
or consent of the governed were the measure of democracy? There must be some other,
substantive standard or idea of democracy by which we assess such majoritarian actions
as undemocratic.
The fundamental idea of democracy is that people make the rules that govern the
terms and conditions of their life together.24 As Pericles says in the Funeral Oration, ‘we
Athenians decide public questions for ourselves’.25 Or, as recently echoed by Justice
Kagan in her opinion for the Court in the ‘faithless electors’ case, ‘here, We the People
rule’.26
We recognize that the disenfranchisement of a minority (even if it takes place by
majority vote) is undemocratic because it means that some citizens are excluded from the
process of self-rule. Indeed, we can underscore the point by refining the example.
Suppose that, at the time of exclusion, the dominant group imposes an additional require-
ment: All subsequent legislation must be approved by a supermajority of the remaining
voters such that no legislation can be enacted that wouldn’t have passed by majority vote
before the exclusion. Thus, assume a hypothetical community in which the disenfran-
chised group makes up 20% of the population. A 64% supermajority of the remaining
voters would ensure that any legislation was supported by 51% of the total population –
that is, that it would have passed by a majority vote even under the earlier, more inclusive
regime. This system would still be undemocratic because it is a form of oligarchy in
which only privileged members of the community decide the terms of social life.27 So,
too, with the suppression of unpopular speech: Those who hold the unpopular view
might still vote. But, if they are not free to persuade their fellow citizens to join in
support of their position, they are not meaningful participants in the process of collective
self-rule.
Why, then, is it conventional to identify democracy with majority rule? The answer is
that majority rule is essential to democracy and, therefore, serves as a metonym or
shorthand for it. In an earlier idiom, Madison and Hamilton identified majority rule with
‘the republican principle’.28 Indeed, Hamilton insisted that ‘fundamental maxim of
republican government . . . requires that the sense of the majority should prevail’.29
Majority rule is the only decision-making procedure that implements the fundamental
democratic idea of collective self-governance. A supermajority requirement may seem
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more democratic because it means that any decision has the support of more of the
voters. On this logic, unanimous consent would seem better still because no one would
be compelled to follow a rule that he or she had not agreed to.30 But, aside from the
impracticalities of such requirements, systems of this sort are less democratic because
they enable a minority veto.31 A small, like-minded group (or, under an unanimity
requirement, a single individual) can systematically frustrate the will of the majority.32
In which case, the rules of social life would be determined not by the decision of the mass
of citizens, but by the minority who effectively control the agenda.33 (This was true of
the U.S. Senate in the 116th Congress, where the 53-vote Republican majority repre-
sented 44% of the population and approximately 47% of the electorate.) A political
system that gives a small group of citizens a greater voice – that is, that empowers some
citizens over others – is not a democracy, but a form of oligarchy.
It follows that democracy is the form of government in which all citizens have an
equal voice. In a simple democracy, people vote by raising their hands – a voting
procedure in which each person is necessarily equal. Majority rule, together with the
one-person-one-vote principle,34 is the only decision-making procedure that fully meets
the democratic standard.35
We have taken the long way around to highlight the crucial (though sadly over-
looked36) point that democracy requires political equality. Thus, we have seen that there
is an asymmetric relation between democracy and majority rule: Democracy entails
majority rule (D |= MR), but majority rule does not necessarily correlate with democracy
(MR6¼ D). Political equality is, so to speak, the additional term that solves this equation
(D ¼ MR þ PE). We can now refine our earlier definition to say that democracy is a
system in which people have an equal say in determining the rules that govern social
life.37 Collective self-governance, in other words, isn’t self-government unless everyone
has an equal voice. As de Tocqueville explains, when ‘all the citizens take a part in the
government’, then ‘nobody can wield tyrannical power; men will be perfectly free
because they are entirely equal, and they will be perfectly equal because they are entirely
free’.38
We are now in position to appreciate the intimate relations between democracy and
the rule of law. First, the rule of law is the mechanism by which democracy is realized.
The people (or their elected representatives) choose the terms of collective life and
implement those decisions through law. Suppose, for example, a community adopts
health legislation requiring restaurants to post nutritional information or citizens to wear
masks during a pandemic. Those laws are enforced by various officials (judges, prose-
cutors, administrators, etc.). If they are not applied equally and comprehensively, the
health of the community will be compromised and the authority of democratic decision-
making undermined. A society in which people could ‘opt out’ would no longer be a
system of collective self-governance but of radical individual autonomy (or anarchy).39
Conversely, if the law is applied equally and comprehensively, then as de Tocqueville
says, there can be no tyranny: When the majority make only those laws that apply also to
themselves, the minority need not fear being singled out for oppression. Finally, officials
must be accountable to the law, both in their official duties (e.g. enforcing the posting
regulation) and in their behaviour (e.g. wearing masks themselves) because they are both
agents and addressees of democratic decision-making.40
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Madison got it backwards: You must first enable the people to regulate themselves
and, in the next place, oblige the officials to be governed by that law.
Second, and more profoundly, democracy and the rule of law both affirm the equal
dignity of all persons. As Hannah Arendt observes, ‘men were by nature (jusEi) not
equal, and needed an artificial institution, the polis, which by virtue of its nomoB [nomos]
would make them equal’.41 The practices of democracy – voting, freedom of speech and
debate – offer each citizen an equal say in making the law. So, too, the rule of law
guarantees that each member of the community is treated equally, subject to the same
laws in the same way without regard to status. Democracy and the rule of law are the
social practices that constitute citizens as equals.
The rule of law has many independently valuable qualities – liberty, order, imparti-
ality, predictability, accountability. But, to valorise the rule of law for its own sake is to
fetishize authority.42 The fundamental values of the rule of law are as the instrument of
democratic self-governance and the expression of the equal dignity of all persons. The
other values flow from or are secondary to those basic ideals.
Syntactically, the rule of law is a ‘what’. Conceptually, it is a ‘who’.
II A more perfect union
It may seem to some that I have brought you along on a fool’s errand. In grounding the
rule of law in collective self-rule, I have answered the initial question only to recreate the
problem of partiality and interest that the rule of law was meant to solve. After all, on
the liberal view, the rigorous impartiality of law is what preserves our autonomy and
protects us from exploitation and abuse by the majority. If we do not ensure that reason
and law rule, won’t we be vulnerable to the whims and passions of passing majorities?
On this liberal view, democracy and the rule-of-law ideal stand in necessary tension.43
And this just brings us back full circle to the questions with which we started.
Today, we read the phrase ‘a government of laws, not of men’ as an assertion of rule
by the impersonal force of law. That was not its original meaning. James Harrington
coined the phrase in the mid-17th century; for him, it expressed the traditional republican
idea of the rule of virtue over self-interest. ‘And as a commonwealth is a government of
laws and not of men, so is this the principality of the virtue and not of the man; if that fail
or set in one, it riseth in another, which is created his immediate successor’.44 Harring-
ton’s focus was on the pragmatic problem of system design. How does one structure
government such that the people who make the laws do so on the basis of reason and not
passion or self-interest? This is what we earlier identified as the circularity problem:
But seeing as they that make the laws in commonwealths are but men, the main question
seems to be how a commonwealth comes to be an empire of laws and not of men? or how
the debate or result of a commonwealth is so sure to be according to reason, seeing that they
who debate and they who resolve be but men.45
Harrington’s solution had both an institutional and economic component. Institution-
ally, he proposed a tripartite system: ‘the commonwealth consisteth of the senate pro-
posing, the people resolving, and the magistracy executing’.46 The senate would be
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selected by ballot and rotation (so that if virtue ‘fail or set in one, it riseth in another’), the
popular assembly by election, and the magistrate would be ‘answerable unto the people
that his execution be according unto the law’.47
His economic proposal, which he saw as the ‘foundation of government’,48 was for an
equitable division of property that he called an ‘equal agrarian’.49 A government of laws
was, for Harrington, the logical outcome of legislation by people of equalized estates,
equalized interests and equalized power.50 The congruence of interests among estate
holders would insure that the decisions of a commonwealth would be made with an eye
to the common good and, thus, ‘according to reason’.51 The result would be a govern-
ment of virtuous laws and not a mere reflection of the self-interest of the powerful. As he
explained, ‘no man is governed by another man, but by that only which is the common
interest, by which means this amounteth unto a government of laws, and not of men’.52
Whatever the flaws of his political theory – Madison was certainly no fan53 – Har-
rington’s account illuminates three enduring points. First, the rule of law is not an
abstraction (an impersonal ‘what’) but a practical problem of social organization. It is
a question of how the people who make and administer the law (the ‘who’) can be
entrusted to do so with reason in the public interest. The liberal legalist solution is to
circumvent this problem by constructing a formal system ‘that reaches toward compre-
hensive schemes of welfare and right’ via rules that operate in a logical, consistent
way.54 But, putting aside the implausibility of the task,55 the resulting system would
be incompatible with the very idea of democratic self-governance.
Second, Harrington’s understanding of what constitutes ‘a government of laws, not of
men’ reveals the centrality to democracy of egalitarian social relations. While it may not
be possible to equalize wealth – whether for the reasons identified by Madison56 or
otherwise – a society (such as ours) with wide divergences in wealth, power and interests
will find it difficult to sustain democracy (as ours, in fact, does). Beyond formal political
equality, collective self-governance requires at a minimum that (1) wealth is not a factor
in political influence (the danger of oligarchy), (2) interests are not so divergent and
antagonistic that they cannot be addressed through negotiation and compromise (the
problem of polarization) and (3) there are institutions, such as the public school and the
draft, that foster other-regarding behaviour and mutual respect among citizens
(the challenge of cultivating civic virtue).57
Third, a democracy cannot be indifferent to the quality of its laws because law shapes
both behaviour and character. ‘In a government of laws’, Brandeis famously warned, the
‘Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the
whole people by its example’.58 When the law reflects the special interests of
the powerful,59 it breeds cynicism, contempt for government, selfishness and social
fragmentation.60 Conversely, when the law promotes the public interest in a fair and
even-handed way, it encourages both confidence in institutions and solidarity and mutual
respect among citizens. In the democratic tradition invoked by Brandeis, the rule of law
is the foundation of civic education.61
As Arendt slyly observes, people are not created equal: some are smarter, some are
stronger, some are born into wealth. It takes a legal system to protect the weak from the
strong, to safeguard the credulous from the unscrupulous and to give everyone a voice in
the affairs of social life. At the macro-level, the laws of a democratic polity convey a
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message of human dignity and equality. At the micro-level, the laws provide the template
for the conduct and comportment of its citizens. Replying to Socrates’s claim that virtue
and the excellence (aretē) required for governance cannot be taught, Protagoras
explained that:
Just as, when a child is still learning to write, the teacher draws lines on his book with a
pencil and then makes him write the letters following the lines, so the city lays down the
laws, devised by good lawmakers of the past, for our guidance, and makes us rule and be
ruled according to them. . . . 62
A law requiring masks during a pandemic, for example, embodies concern for one’s
fellow citizens. Thus, Harrington maintained: ‘“Give us good men and they will make us
good laws” is the maxim of a demagogue. . . . But “give us good orders, and they will
make us good men” is the maxim of a legislator and the most infallible in the politics’.63
Earlier, I argued that the rule of law is the instrument of democratic self-governance
and the expression of the equality of all persons. We can now refine that claim to say that
democracy and the rule of law exist in a complex, reflexive relation. The rule of law is
simultaneously before, after, concurrent and synonymous with democracy. It is before
democracy in the sense that it contributes to the formation of citizens with the civic
virtue capable of self-governance. It is after democracy in serving as the instrument
through which democratic decision-making is implemented. It is concurrent with
democracy because it is one of the central social practices that constitute citizens as
equals. And, it is synonymous with democracy because it addresses the question of how
to ensure that government by the people operates for the people (i.e. in their common
interests).
This correspondence would have come as no surprise to the ancient Greeks who used
the same word – isonomia – to name both democracy and what we now call the rule of
law. Martin Ostwald tells us that, nomos (nomoB) abruptly replaced thēsmos (yEsmoB) as
the Greek word for law and this occurred at the time of the democratic reforms of
Cleisthenes around 508–507 BC. While thēsmos signifies ‘something imposed by an
external agency, conceived as standing apart and on a higher plane than the ordinary’,64
nomos implies an obligation ‘motivated less by the authority of the agent who imposed it
than by the fact that it is regarded and accepted as valid by those who live under it’.65
A compound of isos, meaning ‘equal’, and nomos, isonomia was the most prominent
and popular of a trio of cognate terms for democracy and its institutions that included
isēgoria, the equal right of poor and working people to address the assembly, and
isokratia, equality of power.66 Isonomia both preceded the coinage of the term ‘democ-
racy’ (a compound of demos ‘the people’ and kratos ‘power’) and provided the norma-
tive force for the democratic ideal. ‘Dēmokratia does no more than describe a fact’,
Gregory Vlastos explains, ‘Isonomia expresses an idea, indeed a whole set of ideas by
which the partisans of democracy justified the rule of the people’.67 By the time of
Cleisthenes’s reforms, isonomia had come to mean ‘not . . . a state of equal law for
everybody’ but ‘the ideal of a community in which the citizens had their equal share’.68
Contemporary conceptions of the rule of law as an impersonal force restraining
arbitrary governmental action reflect the assumptions of Enlightenment rationalist
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discourse in which reason restrains the will to power. For the ancient Greeks, in contrast,
it was the sharing of power that constrained abuse of or by the law. Isonomia, Vlastos
elaborates, ‘designates a political order in which the rule of law and responsible gov-
ernment are maintained by the equal distribution of political power’.69
For the Greeks, ‘democracy and the rule of law’ was a tautology. Democracy meant
‘to rule and be ruled in turn’.70 There was, in a real sense, no separation between the
citizens who made the law and those to whom the law applied: Athenian law prohibited
‘the introduction of any law that does not affect all citizens alike’. As Demosthenes went
on to explain, this statute represented ‘the true spirit of democracy. As every man has an
equal share in the constitution [politeia] generally, so this statute asserts his equal share
in the laws’.71 (Recall de Tocqueville’s observation that, in a democracy where everyone
participates, people are ‘perfectly free because they are entirely equal, and they will be
perfectly equal because they are entirely free’.) Every Greek citizen had both an equal
share in the provenance of the law and an equal stake in its efficacy. ‘For the Greeks’,
Martin Ostwald observes, ‘freedom and equality, as well as the State itself, are entities
that citizens share through the community to which they belong’.72
In a modern, differentiated society, the elegance of a single law for everyone is not
possible. The right of entry onto property for the firefighter and the health inspector
cannot be the same as it is for all other citizens. Land use regulations could hardly apply
to all landowners without differentiating among wetlands, agricultural areas and urban
spaces. The greater complexity of modern society necessarily transforms the command
of equality into a more limited rule that laws must include all those similarly situated
with respect to the purpose of the law.73 Because the determination of who is ‘similarly
situated’ is hardly mechanical or self-evident, modern courts recognize the difficulties of
the line-drawing exercise and usually defer to legislative determinations.74
The symmetry of ruling and being ruled is irretrievably fractured in modern society.
Laws are made by a professional political class whose re-election, fund-raising and other
incentives diverge significantly from those of their constituents. Legislation tends to be
problem-oriented rather than general, and that is under the best of circumstances. Often,
it takes the form of interest-group competition in which entrenched economic interests
have significant advantages with respect to mobilization and resources that skew the
process in their favor.75
Core rule-of-law values could nevertheless be maintained in a healthy democracy, but
it would require the kind of political norms and conditions (the ‘who’) clearly lacking in
our current moment. These would include (1) a political presumption against departures
from generality and neutrality in lawmaking, (2) mechanisms to address the significant
problems of oligarchy endemic to our systems of political finance and legislative lobby-
ing, (3) a more equal distribution of electoral power and (4) measures to overcome the
problem of polarization and foster a revived sense of common purpose.76 Developments
of this magnitude would require major cultural, political and legal change. With the
possible exception of changes in electoral distribution, they are not the kinds of reforms
that could be achieved through constitutional adjudication.
The track record of the courts, in any event, has contributed to – rather than amelio-
rated – the decline of rule-of-law values. The Supreme Court has supported role specia-
lization in the modern constitutional state, applying judge-made immunity doctrines to
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protect officials at all levels. Doctrines of executive and prosecutorial discretion,77
official and governmental immunity from suit78 and legislative and executive privilege79
applied by constitutional courts wielding the power of judicial review undermine the
comprehensiveness, impartiality and accountability required by the rule-of-law ideal.
The ‘who’ of the rule of law is no longer the democratic community of lawmaking
citizens. Law increasingly becomes an autonomous, bureaucratic authority administered
from above.
It is not surprising, then, that the modern constitutional system does a poor job of
protecting citizens – especially minority citizens – from state violence. In this context,
Michel Rosenfeld’s point that ‘the rule of law seems definitely on the side of the state,
and often against the citizen’ is poignant. Much has been said in the wake of protests
following the killing of George Floyd about the role of qualified immunity in shielding
police from accountability. But the problem lies as much with the constitutional rules
governing police use of force, which have become increasingly solicitous of the police.80
Both phenomena reflect a structural flaw of the judiciary for whom, as Robert Cover
observes, the identification with state violence is constitutive. ‘[L]egal interpretation is
as a practice incomplete without violence . . . because it depends upon the social practice
of violence for its efficacy’.81 This alignment with state authority impedes judges’ ability
to act as an effective counterweight. Because judges partake in ‘the institutional privi-
lege of force’,82 they are susceptible to the seductions of its power.83 The predictable
result ‘is deference to the authoritarian application of violence, whether it originates in
court orders or in systems of administration’.84
We can encapsulate the argument of this article by considering how each of the
different views of the rule of law might respond to the problem of police violence. Only
the Madisonian conception of law as authority is plausibly consistent with the current
state of affairs. (And, as just noted, this presents as a very dark picture of the rule of law.)
Both liberal and democratic conceptions of the rule of law, in contrast, would see
endemic police violence against African Americans as a violation of the equal dignity
and respect due all persons. Both would see it as a problem of accountability.
The liberal and democratic conceptions of the rule of law would diverge, however, in
how they conceptualize the accountability problem. The liberal view would see police
violence as a failure of some officers to conform their actions to law, instead giving vent
to prejudice, abuse or the brute imposition of power (the ‘few bad apples’ cliché).
Consequently, the remedy would focus on getting the right mix of incentives – such
as specific legal limitations on police conduct, the elimination of qualified immunity,
implicit bias training85 or mandatory liability insurance requirements for officers86 – to
change individual police behaviour. The democratic view, in contrast, would see police
violence as reflecting a breakdown in the process of self-governance itself. Cognizant of
the separation of rulers and ruled, it would identify the accountability problem as arising
from the marginalization of African Americans within the political community. (No one
thinks that police would treat wealthy White citizens in the same callous and brutal
ways.) Accordingly, it would recognize that the solution lies fundamentally in the
empowerment of African American citizens and their inclusion as full and equal mem-
bers of the democratic community. The crisis of police violence, in other words, is a
crisis of the unequal distribution of political power.87
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Apart from the suite of democratic values of which it is a part, the rule-of-law ideal is
easily reduced to an estranged and alienated ‘what’. As an ensemble, in contrast, the trio
of equality, democracy and the rule of law offers an attractive, even enticing vision of the
‘who’ we might be.
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Notes
1. Such a society does have one law with which everyone complies: the voting rule which
specifies that the majority (or some designated supermajority) rules. Although any group also
has rules defining membership, these are generally susceptible to ongoing redefinition by the
majority.
2. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J. concurring).
3. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (‘The government of the United
States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly
cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a
vested legal right’.). These rules may originate in the common law (as did the right in Mar-
bury), statutes or the Constitution. The key point is that they represent an impersonal authority
impartially administered.
4. Scalia (1989).
5. Scalia (1989: 1178–80). For a critique of this understanding of how rules work, see Winter
(2001a: 186-222).
6. Thus, in Justice Scalia’s co-authored book on appellate advocacy, the only form of legal
reasoning that he identifies is the syllogism. Scalia and Garner (2008).
7. Compare Habermas (1996) (co-originality thesis).
8. Winter (2020).
9. The Federalist Papers (1961: No. 51, 319).
10. Rosenfeld (2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id¼262350. The
critical phrase here is ‘to the extent that . . . ’ For, as Robert Cover points out, courts often
invoke jurisdictional doctrines to avoid having to address violence by state actors. Cover
(1984: 53–56).
11. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177 (‘It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is’.); see also National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 604
(1998) (‘But courts cannot allow a legislature’s conclusory belief in constitutionality, however
sincere, to trump incontrovertible unconstitutionality, for “it is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is”’.); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507, 536 (1997) (‘When the Court has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within the
province of the Judicial Branch, which embraces the duty to say what the law is’.).
12. Pocock (1975: 324): ‘If laws can attain the status of reason . . . then laws must rule and not
men. . . . But the argument is in danger of becoming circular: laws ensure that reason rules and
not particular passions, but they are invented and maintained by men and can prevail only
when men are guided by reason to the public good and not by passion to private ends. The laws
must maintain themselves, then, regulating the behavior of the men who maintain them. . . . ’
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Compare Hobbes (1994: 112): ‘that covenants being but words, and breath, have no force to
oblige, contain, constrain, or protect any man, but what it has from the public sword’.
13. Michelman (1988: 287).
14. Winter (2001b: 155–66, 162–63).
15. See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 166 (‘But when the legislature proceeds to impose on that officer other
duties . . . he is so far the officer of the law; is amenable to the laws for his conduct; and cannot
at his discretion sport away the vested rights of others’.); Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343 U.S.
at 646 (Jackson, J., concurring) (The ‘take Care’ clause ‘gives a governmental authority that
reaches so far as there is law, the [due process clause] gives a private right that authority shall
go no farther. These signify about all there is of the principle that ours is a government of laws,
not of men, and that we submit ourselves to rulers only if under rules’.).
16. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 618 (1974); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579 (1952).
17. One could also characterize this dimension of the rule of law as ‘impartiality’. But for reasons
that will appear shortly, this liberal characterization misses important dimensions of the
concept.
18. Dicey (1982: 181): ‘every man, whatever be his rank or position, is subject to the ordinary law
of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals’.
19. See Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029 (1765); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S.
(7 How.) 1 (1849); Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
20. Chittenden (1998).
21. This changed with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
22. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 160 (1908).
23. Compare United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938). Democracy
is a more-or-less, rather than all-or-nothing phenomenon. Political systems can be judged
along an axis that runs from democratic to oligarchic (and thence to autocratic). And, democ-
racy may not be the only desideratum. See Winter (2012: 204–05): ‘we make different kinds
of judgments about . . . various democratic arrangements’ and the judgments that some are
‘better, others more democratic . . . need not converge’.
24. A more precise definition would be that democracy ‘consists in the sharing of authority with
others under conditions of mutual recognition and respect’. Winter (2012: 203, 223–37). The
simplified description in the text is consistent with this strong, normative view.
25. Thucydides (2013) Book 2.37.1, 40.2-3.
26. Chiafalo v. Washington, 591 U. S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2328 (2020). This idea is usually
referred to as popular sovereignty. But it would seem both simpler and more accurate to
conceptualize the issue directly in terms of self-governance. This avoids reifications such
as ‘the People’ or ‘the general will’ and, as discussed below, grounds democracy directly in
the normative ideals of political equality and collective autonomy.
27. The Federalist, No. 39, 237 (Madison) (emphasis in original): ‘It is essential to such a
[republican] government that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an
inconsiderable proportion or a favored class of it’.
28. The Federalist, No. 10, 75 (Madison); The Federalist, No. 71, 430 (Hamilton).
29. The Federalist, No. 22, 142 (Hamilton) (emphasis added).
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30. If it seems better, it is because our liberal culture conflates individual autonomy with democ-
racy. The problems with grounding democracy in individual autonomy are discussed in
Winter (2012: 205–10, 238–41). The best evidence of the primacy of individual autonomy
over democracy in our culture can be found in the Supreme Court’s campaign finance cases.
See Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721 (2011);
Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1 (1975).
31. The Federalist, No. 22, 143 (Hamilton) (‘To give a minority a negative upon the majority
(which is always the case where more than a majority is requisite to a decision) is, in its
tendency, to subject the sense of the greater number to that of the lesser number’.). There may,
of course, be practical political reasons for a minority veto of this sort as when an intractably
divided society needs to reassure a fearful minority. But, Hamilton continued, the ‘real
operation’ of unanimity or supermajority requirements ‘is to embarrass the administration,
to destroy the energy of the government, and to substitute the pleasure, caprice, or artifices of
an insignificant, turbulent, or corrupt junto to the regular deliberations and decisions of a
respectable majority’.
32. This was the position of the slave states in the early Republic. See particularly U.S. Consti-
tution, Art. I, § 2 (the three-fifths clause).
33. Although the minority cannot on its own enact its agenda into law, the effect of the minority
veto is to force the majority to conform its proposals to those acceptable to the minority.
Bachrach and Baratz (1962: 947–53); Elshtain (1990: 136–38).
34. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964); Gray
v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368, 381 (1963).
35. Winter (2019).
36. Rucho v. Common Cause 588 U.S. ___, 139 S.Ct. 2484 (2019); Gill v. Whitford, 585 U.S. ___,
138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).
37. Under real-world conditions of plurality, consent of the governed marks the realistic limits of
the democratic ideal. On one hand, consent of the governed is the flip-side of majority rule; it
is the principle which legitimates democratic outcomes that command less than unanimous
assent. On the other, it defines the minimal condition under which a government with an
indifferent or apathetic citizenry can tolerably be called a democracy.
38. de Tocqueville (1988: 503).
39. On the fundamental protections for the minority in a system of collective self-governance,
see Winter (2012: 204–10, 223–39). Compare INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 966 (1983)
(Powell, J., concurring) (‘Congress is most accountable politically when it prescribes rules
of general applicability. When it decides rights of specific persons, those rights are subject
to “the tyranny of a shifting majority”’.).
40. Compare The Federalist, No. 78, 466 (Hamilton): ‘[E]very act of a delegated authority,
contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised, is void’.
41. Arendt (1965: 30–31).
42. See Winter (2020: 352–59).
43. Compare Michelman (1999: 5–6). Michelman focuses on the tension between democracy and
constitutionalism. But, whether the source of the law is the Constitution or the common law,
the tension derives from the fact that judicial interpretations or judge-made rules often have no
direct or obvious warrant in democratic decision-making. In the early Republic, Jeffersonian
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radicals were particularly opposed to the application of the common law by unelected judges.
Wilentz (2005: 121–23).
44. Harrington (1992: 35).
45. Harrington (1992: 35, 20–21). Harrington here is reflecting directly on Hobbes’s critique (note
12, supra). See Harrington (1992: 35, 24–25).
46. Harrington (1992: 25). Harrington continued that such a government would be ‘complete’
because it ‘partake[s] of the aristocracy as in the senate, of the democracy as in the people, and
of the monarchy as in the magistracy’. John Adams, along with other Americans, would
esteem a version of this notion of ‘mixed government’. See Wood (1998: 198–200, 203–
06): ‘It was this Commonwealth understanding of the mixed polity, perceived through
“Aristotle, Livy, and Harrington”, that enabled John Adams in 1775 to argue that the uncor-
rupted “British constitution is nothing more nor less than a republic in which the king is first
magistrate”’. Bailyn (1992: 273–74, 282–83 n.50): ‘Throughout, however, he [Adams] was
grappling with the problem of recreating the “equipoised” balance of the English constitution
in the circumstances of the American states’.
47. Harrington (1992: 25). See also Harrington (1992: 34): ‘the senate debating and proposing, the
people resolving, and the magistracy executing by an equal rotation through the suffrage of the
people given by the ballot’.
48. Harrington (1992: 271–72): ‘All government is interest, and the predominant interest gives the
matter or foundation of government. . . . If the many or the people have the whole, . . . the
interest of the many or the people is the predominant interest, and causes democracy’.
49. ‘An equal agrarian is a perpetual law, establishing and preserving the balance of dominion by
such a distribution, that no one man or number of men, within the compass of the few or
aristocracy, can come to overpower the whole people by their possessions in lands’. Harring-
ton (1992: 33); see also Harrington (1992: 34): ‘An equal commonwealth . . . is a government
established upon an equal agrarian’.
50. ‘[E]quality of estates causes equality of power, and equality of power is the liberty, not only of
the commonwealth, but of every man’. Harrington (1992, 20). See Pocock (1975: 387–88):
‘[Harrington held] that only a democracy of landholders – that is, only a society where a
demos, or many, of landed freemen held land in relative equality – possessed the human
resources (Machiavelli might have said the materia) necessary to distribute political authority
in the diversified and balanced ways they created a self-stabilizing politeia’.
51. Harrington (1992: 19–22): ‘And if reason be nothing else but interest, and the interest of
mankind be the right interest, then the reason of mankind must be right reason. Now compute
well, for if the interest of popular government come the nearest unto the interest of mankind,
then the reason of popular government must come the nearest unto right reason’.
52. Harrington (1771: 362), available online at: https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/916#Harrington_
0050-version3_1550.
53. In The Federalist, No. 10, 72–73, Madison notes that one way of ‘curing the mischiefs of
faction’ is to remove its causes ‘by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same
passions, and the same interests’. The reference seems clearly to Harrington. Madison argues
that this expedient is ‘impracticable’ because ‘diversity in the faculties of men’ naturally leads
to disparities in wealth and from this ‘ensues the division of society into different interests and
parties’. Madison, of course, wrote at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution at a time
when the commercial economy was expanding whereas Harrington lived a century earlier in a
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largely agrarian society. Madison’s solution to the problem of faction was a large republic,
which would make it difficult for factions to unite and coordinate effectively. But this solu-
tion, too, has proved impractical.
54. Unger (1996: 36, 46).
55. There is an anti-formalist tradition that starts with Holmes’s The Common Law (1881) and
runs through Roscoe Pound, Karl Llewelyn and the Legal Realists, to Duncan Kennedy and
Critical Legal Studies (including such others as Robert Cover). A Clearing in the Forest
(Winter 2001a) draws on this tradition to lay out the cognitive and epistemological reasons
that make the formal vision of law impossible.
56. See note 53 supra.
57. See Skocpol (2003); Putnam (2000); Sandel (1996).
58. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
59. LaForgia and Vogel (2020) (‘Mr. Trump’s cabinet includes a former coal lobbyist as
administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, a former lobbyist for the defense
contractor Raytheon Technologies as defense secretary, a lobbyist for the auto industry at
the helm of the Energy Department and a former oil and gas lobbyist as interior
secretary’.).
60. Compare Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (‘If the Government becomes a
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it
invites anarchy’.).
61. As Wood summarizes Protagoras’s argument for democracy: ‘Life in a civilized and humane
community, which has courts of justice and the rule of law, as well as education, is the school
of civic virtue; and the community’s customs and laws are the most effective teachers’. Wood
(2008: 61).
62. Plato (2009: 326d). ‘Protagoras’s speech is the only substantive and systematic argument for
the democracy to survive from ancient Greece’. Wood (2008: 59).
63. Harrington (1992: 64). As Harrington later notes: ‘Good orders make evil men good, and bad
orders make good men evil’. Harrington (1992: 274). See also Pocock (1975: 196): ‘Buoni
ordini [good orders] produce both buona milizia [a good militia] and buona educazione [a
good civic education] . . . . Freedom, civic virtue, and military discipline seem to exist in a
close relation to one another’.
64. Ostwald (1969: 55).
65. Ostwald (1969: 158–60); see also Wood (2008: 36): Nomos ‘suggests something held in
common, whether pasture or custom’.
66. Vlastos (1995: 105); see also Wood (2008: 36–39).
67. Vlastos (1995: 96).
68. Ehrenberg (1950: 514–48, 530–31); see Wood (2008: 36): ‘Cleisthenes himself seemed to
describe the new political order as isonomia’.
69. Vlastos (1995: 107).
70. Aristotle’s Politics (2013: 1317a40–1317b2-10); see also Protagoras, quoted above note 60.
71. Demosthenes, ‘Against Timocrates’, (59) in Demosthenes (1986: 411).
72. Ostwald (1996: 49–61, 55).
73. Tussman and tenBroek (1949: 346): ‘A reasonable classification is one which includes all
persons who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law’.
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74. The classic statements of what is called the ‘rational basis test’ are Carolene Products, 304
U.S. at 151-54; Williams v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) and Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372
U.S. 726 (1963).
75. Lowi (2009). For a thorough discussion of the distribution of advantages in mobilization and
resources and how they affect different modes of regulation, see Komisar (1990: 23–77) and
Komisar (1997).
76. Tussman and tenBroek saw early on that the ‘demand for equal laws becomes meaningless’ in
the context of a legislative process of interest-pluralist bargaining and that ‘the requirement
that laws be equal rests upon a theory of legislation quite distinct from that of pressure groups –
a theory which puts forward some conception of a ‘general good’ . . . .’ Tussman and tenBroek
(1949: 350).
77. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); see also
Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973).
78. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 US 800 (1982) (extended qualified immunity from suit under §
1983); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 US 44 (1996) (striking down under the Eleventh
Amendment congressional authorization to sue state actors to require them to bargain in good
faith with Indian Tribes).
79. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (absolute immunity of state legislative officials
from damages actions under § 1983); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (absolute
immunity of President from suit for damages for unconstitutional actions).
80. Compare Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1986) (‘Where the suspect poses no immediate
threat to the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him
does not justify the use of deadly force to do so’.); with Graham v. O’Connor, 490 U.S. 386,
397-98 (1989) (question is one of ‘objective unreasonableness’ and evidence of malicious or
sadistic intent is irrelevant) and Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (‘Garner was simply an
application of the Fourth Amendment’s ‘reasonableness’ test . . . ’). See also Plumhoff v.
Rickard, 572 U. S. 765 (2014).
81. Cover (1986: 1613); see also Cover (1984: 47) (‘all judges are in some way people of
violence’).
82. Cover (1984: 54).
83. See, for example, Plumhoff, 572 U.S. at 777 (12 additional shots fired after the progress of
suspect’s car was blocked were permissible because, ‘if police officers are justified in firing at
a suspect in order to end a severe threat to public safety, the officers need not stop shooting
until the threat has ended’.).
84. Cover (1984: 56).
85. All these are part of the Justice in Policing Act, H.R. 7120, which was passed by the House on
25 June 2020 and sent to the Senate to moulder.
86. See Ramirez et al. (2019).
87. Compare Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652 (1966) (the Voting Rights Act barring
English-language literacy test ‘may be viewed as a measure to secure for the Puerto Rican
community residing in New York nondiscriminatory treatment by government [in] the pro-
vision or administration of governmental services, such as public schools, public housing and
law enforcement’.).
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